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Abstract
The article outlines reasons for the sig-
nificant increase of the hazard posed by 
weapons of mass destruction in the current 
decade. Despite the international commu-
nity’s efforts made throughout the years, 
it has not been possible to eliminate them, 
significantly lower their arsenal or pre-
vent their building or transfer. What has 
increased is the importance of weapons of 
mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, 
as a force factor in international relations. 
This tendency will probably continue in 
the foreseeable future. Therefore, the arti-
cle focuses on explaining the mechanisms 
of this process and its connections with 
numerous events and facts influencing 
international security. Special significance 
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Abstrakt
W artykule przedstawiono przyczyny, dla 
których w ciągu obecnej dekady nastąpił 
znaczący wzrost zagrożenia bronią maso-
wego rażenia. Pomimo wieloletnich wysił-
ków społeczności międzynarodowej broni 
tej nie udało się wyeliminować ani znaczą-
co ograniczyć jej arsenałów czy też wyklu-
czyć możliwość jej budowy lub transferu. 
Wzrosło natomiast znaczenie broni maso-
wego rażenia, zwłaszcza jądrowej, jako 
czynnika siły w stosunkach międzyna-
rodowych. Tendencja ta prawdopodobnie 
utrzyma się w dającej się przewidzieć 
przyszłości. Dlatego też podczas opraco-
wywania artykułu skoncentrowano się na 
wyjaśnieniu mechanizmów tego procesu
i jego powiązań z wieloma innymi wyda-
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is ascribed to a precise estimation of the 
risk posed by weapons of mass destruc-
tion and determination of its hierarchy. 
Moreover, the article presents the forms 
and methods of the activities undertaken 
by countries and international organisa-
tions regarding the prevention of prolifera-
tion (via disarmament treaties and informal 
forums) and assesses their effectiveness.
Key words: weapon of mass destruction, 
proliferation, nuclear deterrence, disarma-
ment
Introduction
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a conventional name of a set com-
prising different categories and subcategories of so-called unconventional weap-
ons.1 Due to the highly destructive impact on people, infrastructure and the 
environment, it constitutes a significant hazard to regional and global security. 
This is confirmed by various examples of using the individual WMD types in 
international and internal armed conflicts as well as terrorist attacks.
When one limits the article scope to the present decade of the 21st century, 
about a dozen of such incidents have been recorded in the world. The most spec-
tacular of them were reported on by mass media. However, little is known about 
the remaining ones as they caused smaller losses or took place in inaccessible 
zones, e.g. due to ongoing fights.
The chemical attacks of 2013—2018 in Syria prove that reconnaissance2 and 
identification3 of the used toxic substances is insufficient for the purposes of 
1 One of the first definitions of weapons of mass destruction was published in 1948 
in a resolution by the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments. It states 
that WMD includes “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons [and] certain 
‘lethal’ chemical and biological weapons”.
2 Contamination reconnaissance — an action aimed at determining the presence of ra-
dioactive substances or biological or chemical agents as well as supplementing and conform-
ing the preliminary dispatches. See Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 7 January 2013 
on contamination detection and announcement as well as competence of authorities in these 
matters (§2, par. 10), Dz.U. of 2013, item 96.
3 Contamination identification — actions aimed at determining the asset type used 
during an attack (incident). It includes sampling of contaminated materials as well as trans-
port and a laboratory analysis of the samples. The evidence analysis mentioned in the text 
rzeniami i faktami mającymi wpływ na 
bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Należy 
tu podkreślić szczególne znaczenie, jakie 
przypisano roli precyzyjnego szacowania 
ryzyka stwarzanego przez broń masowe-
go rażenia i określeniu jego hierarchii. 
Ponadto przedstawiono formy i metody 
działania państw i organizacji międzyna-
rodowych w zakresie zapobiegania prolife-
racji (w ramach traktatów rozbrojeniowych 
i forów nieformalnych) oraz dokonano 
oceny ich efektywności.
Słowa kluczowe: broń masowego rażenia, 
proliferacja, odstraszanie nuklearne, roz-
brojenie
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evidence proceedings, which hinders unambiguous identification of perpetra-
tors. This is caused first and foremost by the fact that every stage of the WMD 
acquisition and development programmes as well as the planning and prepara-
tion of attacks is a strictly guarded secret.
The wide series of the assets enabling operational use of weapons of mass 
destruction (rocket missiles and artillery, aircraft, submarines) is continuously 
modernised, i.a. concerning their range, throw-weight and CEP.4
The indispensable high level of technological advancement makes the WMD 
development and modernisation programmes very costly. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to Kenneth Waltz’s theory, selected countries attempt to acquire WMD, es-
pecially nuclear weapons, in order to counterbalance their position in relation to 
a potential enemy which already owns such weapons. Another significant fact 
is participation in the international deterrence mechanisms and building a much 
more effective military potential as an alternative to long-long-lasting and in-
creasingly expensive conventional armament.
In such situation, the diversified forms of combating the proliferation5 of 
weapons of mass destruction, especially those concerning armament control and 
so-called non-proliferation initiatives, constitute one of the priority tasks for in-
dividual countries, groups of countries and international organisations. Due to 
the heterogeneous nature of WMD programmes as well as the dynamism of the 
hard-to-predict phenomena and processes which accompany them, those actions 
are largely uncertain.6 This makes one ask a number of ontological questions 
concerning the risk posed by WMD and its proliferation, which is expressed 
as a product of the probability of an attack (incident) and its health-related, po-
litical, sociological, economic and environmental effects.7 Consequently, it is 
is conducted by certified laboratories using scientifically validated analytical methods. See 
more in: Obrona przed bronią masowego rażenia w operacjach połączonych DD/3.8(A), 
Bydgoszcz 2013, p. 34—35.
4 Throw-weight — a concept introduced by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 
I) of 26 May 1972. It enables the classification of ballistic missiles. It denotes the maximum 
weight a missile can carry including the weight of all of its elements, e.g. the navigation and 
guidance systems, excluding the weight of engines and fuel. CEP (circular error probable) — 
a coefficient enabling one to calculate the probability of target destruction. It is defined as 
the radius of the circle within which 50% of launched rocket missiles will end their flight.
5 Proliferation (Latin: proles — progeny, fero — I carry) — a term taken from biological 
sciences which means growth and multiplication. Its Polish equivalents are “spreading” and 
“dissemination”.
6 Uncertainty in decision theory — a situation where specific decisions may cause va-
rious effects depending on which possible state of affairs actually takes place, but no occur-
rence probability is known. Source: Encyklopedia Zarządzania (an online management ency-
clopaedia). Cf. Z. Redziak: Niepewność w podejmowaniu decyzji. “Zeszyty Naukowe AON” 
2013, nr 2(91), p. 102.
7 J. Wolanin: Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa obywateli. Ochrona ludności na czas pokoju. 
Warsaw 2005, p. 26.
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natural to search for effective methods of risk analysis8 and assessment which 
translate into projects aiming at its reduction. Those are usually actions in the 
political, economic, legal or military domain.
The inspiration to write this article is the noticeable need for the information 
which enables one to assess the risk posed by WMD as well as for the knowl-
edge which facilitates the forecasting of its changes in the future, with particular 
reference to the hazard-reducing actions undertaken by countries and special-
ised departments of international organisations. An additional aim of the article 
is to present WMD implications for international security and the contemporary 
political relations. The aim defined this way has resulted in the formulation of 
research problems as the following questions:
— What is the hierarchy of the risk posed by WMD types and can its accept-
ability level be defined?
— What is the actual influence of WMD and its delivery programmes on in-
ternational security and political relations9 in the second decade of the 21st 
century?
— What actions do countries and international organisations take to limit 
WMD proliferation and what is the effectiveness of those actions?
Due to the limited number of publicly available sources (WMD data are 
usually classified as top secret), the adopted research methodology assumes an 
analysis and interpretation of all the available information sources, which are 
often fragmentary. A helpful factor in this situation is the author’s long-term 
experience in analytical work aimed at the preparation of assessments and fore-
casts concerning WMD hazard (for Poland and various regions of the world) as 
well as practical solutions related to protection against the destructive impact 
of WMD. A significant research mechanism referred to in this article is the 
analysis of selected cases of WMD use and modelling the effects of hypothetical 
incidents with decision-support software.
8 Risk analysis — determination of a scenario according to which the risk may come 
true, i.e. a hazard will turn into a disruption, an incident or a disaster. This is influenced 
by the emergence mechanism of a given hazard, the susceptibility to that hazard in local 
conditions and the ability to react to the effects. A. Kosieradzka, J. Zawiła-Niedźwiecki: 
Zaawansowana metodyka oceny ryzyka w publicznym zarządzaniu kryzysowym. Kraków—
Legionowo 2016, p. 42.
9 “International political relations are interactions between entities the actions of which 
go beyond their own boundaries and take place in a polyarchic, polycentric and decentralised 
environment… International political relations are relationships between independent and 
non-independent entities in which politics plays the superior role”. See more in: P. Ostasze-
wski: Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne. Zarys wykładów. Warszawa 2008, p. 12.
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WMD risk assessment
Weapons of mass destruction include separate categories of combat assets; 
the differences between them concern the technical issues regarding their manu-
facturing and possible use as well as the methods of preventing their use and 
mitigating the effects.
One of the important threads discussed in this article is consideration for the 
stances of the countries which already possess or strive to acquire WMD arse-
nals. These are expressed in their military doctrines. Therefore, it is necessary 
to divide WMD risk into separate categories (risk segmentation) corresponding 
to the adopted division into types within that set (chemical, biological, radio-
logical and nuclear weapon). This assumption defines the pivot of the research 
deliberations and influences the article structure.
The risk analysis and hierarchisation model chosen as optimal for the pur-
poses of this section is the model by FEMA (US Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency). It utilises four partial meters: incident frequency in the past, sus-
ceptibility defining the population number and property value exposed to the 
hazard, the maximum hazard together with the surface area influenced by the 
effects (including the scenario of the most unfavourable incident) and incident 
probability in the whole year. Each of those meters receives a weight and is as-
sessed using points from 0 to 10. The hazard degree is a product of the weight 
and the points. The calculation results obtained using this method reflect the 
degree of the current hazard caused by various WMD types. They are presented 












Chemical weapon Biological weapon Nuclear weapon Radiological weapon
Hazard degree
Fig. 1. The WMD hazard degree in the second decade of the 21st century according to the 
FEMA model. Developed by the author.
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First, the presented distribution of the aggregated hazard value confirms the 
necessity of analysing each WMD type separately; second, it inspires one to 
search for detailed justifications for the determined risk hierarchy. This simul-
taneously constitutes the starting point for subsequent deliberations. The data 
used for the calculations are relative,10 so the results are approximate and are 
used first and foremost to define the structure and intensity of the individual 
hazards in the analysed set. Still, even these approximate results show that all 
WMD types are sources of risk which exceeds so-called acceptable (tolerable)11 
level (100 in the FEMA model) by 0.5 times for radiological weapon and up to 
1.5 times for nuclear weapon.
The risk acceptability concept is related to the ALARP (as low as reason-
ably possible) principle, according to which the risk level should be kept as low 
as possible and if the acceptability limit is exceeded, it becomes necessary to 
undertake all the risk-reducing actions regardless of their costs. Such approach 
allows one to assess the actions taken by the international community concern-
ing WMD non-proliferation in a much wider context. This justifies the “deep de-
fence” principle,12 according to which no security measure is perfect, so actions 
must be diversified. It is the specific situation that influences the decision to 
apply political, diplomatic, legal, economic, information or military measures. It 
must also be stressed that their form and scope is different for each WMD type.
The apocalyptic nature of nuclear weapon
The discovery of nuclear weapon has undoubtedly had a significant impact 
on the history of the world. Used twice at wars and checked during nuclear 
tests,13 it still terrifies the human due to the unimaginable force of its destruction 
10 Relative numbers are quotients of absolute numbers describing interrelated phenome-
na. Relative numbers are widely used in statistical analysis, with special significance ascribed 
to those which characterise the intensity or structure of phenomena. See: T. Michalski: 
Statystyka. Podręcznik. Warszawa 2004, p. 87.
11 Risk acceptability denotes a risk level which both individuals and the society are able 
to accept without specific risk management actions. The acceptable level is also related to 
tolerable risk, defined as a level which the society is able to accept as long as the risk is moni-
tored and risk reduction actions are undertaken. A. Kosieradzka, J. Zawiła-Niedźwiecki: 
Zaawansowana metodyka oceny ryzyka…, p. 264—265.
12 Zapobieganie stratom w przemyśle. Red. A.S. Markowski. Cz. 3: Zarządzanie 
bezpieczeństwem procesowym. Łódź 2000, p. 191.
13 A nuclear test means a single or at least two nuclear explosion(s) conducted at a test 
site within an area delineated by a circle having a diameter of 2 km within a total period of 
0.1 second. Source: Protocol of 1990 to The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear 
Weapon Tests — Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974.
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factors. It is estimated that approx. 2,050 nuclear weapon tests14 have been con-
ducted worldwide in the atmosphere, underground and underwater. The effects 
of using nuclear weapon, without distinguishing between military and civilian 
targets, may occur immediately even in the areas situated far away from the 
detonation location. They include a shock wave, ionising radiation and thermal 
radiation. However, the delayed action of such weapon (from several hours to 
decades) takes the form of radioactive fallout which contains radioactive sub-
stances formed during an explosion (approx. 200 isotopes of 35 elements). Sam-
ple calculations showing the effects of a hypothetical nuclear load application are 
presented in the next part of the article, in Fig. 2.
Nuclear weapon can be classified according to various criteria, the most im-
portant of which include: 
— the number of stages and types of nuclear reactions: single-stage weapon (nu-
clear fission of the nuclei of heavy elements — uranium or plutonium), two-
stage weapon (fission and fusion of light elements) and three-stage weapon 
(works according to the following scheme: fission — fusion — fission)15;
— load name (atomic, hydrogen, thermonuclear);
— purpose (strategic, tactical and operational, tactical);
— load power (very small, small, medium, big and very big).
Due to operational needs, especially the methodology of estimating the ef-
fects of a nuclear explosion, defining the load power is of fundamental impor-
tance. That value means the energy released via a nuclear explosion and is ex-
pressed using a TNT equivalent (units: kilo- or megatons).16 It constitutes the 
basic piece of information which characterises an explosion in military terms 
or a test explosion. Its determination allows one to conduct further calcula-
tions aimed at, among other things, forecasting the radioactive contamination 
zones, fires, casualties, infrastructure destruction etc. It can be established with 
measuring instruments such as seismic, hydroacoustic or infrasound stations17 
14 https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear-we
apons-tests/ (accessed: 2.05.2019).
15 Three-stage nuclear loads — they contain two different fissile materials and a mate-
rial undergoing fusion. At the first stage of an explosion, Uranium-235 or plutonium under-
goes fission. The released energy initiates the fusion of light elements which takes place at 
stage two. The high-energy neutrons emitted during that reaction cause the fission of Ura- 
nium-238 — that reaction takes place at the third explosion stage. These are sometimes 
referred to as “jacket loads” in Polish because Uranium-238 usually constitutes a shell 
(jacket) of three-stage loads (bombs, warheads).
16 J. Kubowski: Broń jądrowa. Warszawa 2008, p. 22—23.
17 The abovementioned stations form the International Monitoring System provided for in the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Seismic stations can locate seismic incidents and 
distinguish between nuclear explosions and earthquakes. Hydroacoustic stations use highly 
sensitive microphones (acoustic sensors of pressure) to detect acoustic waves, including those 
caused by explosions, from a long distance. Infrasound stations detect sound waves of a very 
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or laboratories recording the presence of selected radioactive elements in the at-
mosphere18 as well as based on the parameters of the radioactive cloud estimated 
by specialised observation posts.
The specificity of nuclear weapon has made it play a deterring role from 
the very beginning; this was especially visible during the Cold War. However, 
nuclear deterrence has been modified throughout the years to match the needs 
of the changing political and military situation. Consequently, it has evolved 
into the following subsequent strategies: “conventional forward defence and air 
counter-attack,” “massive retaliation,” “mutually assured destruction” and “elas-
tic reaction” as well as their versions (Schlesinger’s doctrine of limited nuclear 
options of 1974 and Presidential Directive 59 of 1980).19
low frequency in the atmosphere and can distinguish between nuclear explosions, volcanic 
eruptions and falling meteorites. See more in: A. Suda: Traktat o Całkowitym Zakazie Prób 
z Bronią Jądrową — niedokończony rozdział rozbrojenia nuklearnego. “Ekoatom” 2013, 
nr 9, p. 39.
18 The presence of certain radioactive particles (e.g. Cs137, H3, C14, Sr90, I131) in the 
air constitutes irrefutable evidence of having conducted a nuclear explosion. Cs and Sr are 
particularly dangerous to people.
19 “Conventional forward defence and air counter-attack” (1950) was also called “the 
sword and the shield” and was the first strategy adopted by NATO. It assumed the use of the 
American nuclear weapon delivered by strategic aircraft (the sword) and the European con-
ventional forces to ensure defence against a massive Russian attack (the shield). The “mas-
sive retaliation” strategy was developed by the then Secretary of State J.F. Dulles in 1954 
and adopted by NATO three years later. It was a response to the increasing advantage of 
the Soviet Union in conventional forces. The strategy assumed the creation of a “nuclear 
umbrella” over the European NATO Member States to discourage the opposite party from 
aggression. The distribution of the American non-strategic nuclear weapon in Europe also 
began at that time. The “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) theory of 1964 was the basis for 
the defensive doctrines from the Cold War period. Its assumptions were based on the balance 
of power and the belief that the use of nuclear weapon by one party to the conflict would trig-
ger a retaliation strike with disastrous effects. The “elastic reaction” strategy was developed 
in 1967 by the then Secretary of State R. McNamara. It treated the conventional forces as 
the main defence asset, while nuclear weapon was seen as a supporting element. The elastic 
use of nuclear weapon had two meanings. First, to minimise casualties among civilians, it 
was planned to attack only the enemy’s selected nuclear facilities (systems). Second, nuclear 
planning demonstrated clear-cut phases: controlled nuclear escalation aimed at forcing a stop 
to the fights and then a massive nuclear attack (both strategic and non-strategic). In 1974, the 
North Atlantic Alliance acknowledged the role of French and British nuclear forces in nuclear 
deterrence. Schlesinger’s doctrine was developed in the same year. Its main assumptions 
come down to signalling the readiness for further escalation and strategic support for col-
lective defence in Europe. Presidential Directive 59 broadened the range of selective attacks 
(to include i.a. political targets) and assumed an expansion of the commanding systems and 
new combat assets, such as MX and Trident II ballistic missiles, self-controlled missiles 
launched from the aircraft and B-2 bombers. A. Kacprzyk: Polityka jądrowa USA a odstra-
szanie w Europie, notatki z wykładu. War Studies University, 11 April 2018. Unpublished 
material.
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In the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century, nuclear weapon lost 
some of its significance as a retaliation-based deterrence factor. The administra-
tion of G.W. Bush made it play a smaller role and emphasized the integration 
of nuclear forces with conventional offensive assets as well as nuclear arsenal 
elasticity. It was allowed to use nuclear weapon only against a country which 
attacked the United States territory with any weapon of mass destruction. The 
North Atlantic Alliance also reckoned that the hazard of a conflict requiring 
a military response had diminished. Throughout that period, numerous countries 
intensified their effort to enter the Alliance. The hazard which commenced the 
strategic discourse at that time and is still present there is nuclear proliferation 
and rocket missile technology development. This was accompanied by President 
Bush labelling Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “the axis of evil” in 2002.
The contemporary conditions of nuclear deterrence
It was not predicted at the beginning of the present decade that its end would 
see a specific renaissance of nuclear weapon and a return to nuclear deterrence. 
The Global Zero option20 did not seem probable, but the new nuclear policy by 
President B. Obama announced in April 2010 was perceived as a long-term ef-
fort to eliminate this weapon category. It was planned to diminish further the 
significance of nuclear arsenals in comparison with the previous strategy pur-
sued by President Bush, while conventional forces were supposed to gain more 
importance. Obama’s administration limited the possibility of conducting a nu-
clear strike only to the states which owned this kind of weapon. It was simulta-
neously declared that no new technologies of building nuclear resources would 
be developed.21
The adoption of that strategy coincided with the signing of New START 
(Treaty on Measures for the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms) in Prague. The treaty was signed on 9 April 2010 by Presidents B. Obama 
and D. Medvedev and replaced the previous treaty, START I,22 which had ex-
20 The term is the name of an organisation founded in December 2008, which aims at the 
worldwide elimination of nuclear weapon. See more — https://www.globalzero.org/about-us/
our-mission/ (accessed: 2.05.2019).
21 National Security Strategy 2010 — http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf p. 23 
(accessed: 2.05.2019).
22 New START was preceded by the following treaties: Start I (Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Treaty), signed on 31 July 1991, which expired on 5 December 2009, Start II, signed on 
3 January 1993 (it did not enter into force because the Russian parliament did not ratify it) 
and SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), signed on 24 May 2002, under which 
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pired five months earlier. The parties decided that, within seven years, each of 
them would reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 1,55023 pieces distrib-
uted24 on selected delivery means — intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and heavy bombers25 adapted to 
deliver nuclear weapon. The delivery means themselves were limited to 800 
pieces of equipment, including 700 so-called distributed pieces remaining fully 
ready to use. When one remembers that those arms categories were reduced 
in comparison with the SORT and START I treaties by 30% and 70% respec-
tively, one understands the generally favourable comments accompanying the 
signing of New START. The press reports of the time announced a historical 
event, a milestone on the way to the world without nuclear weapons, a break-
through in mutual trust and the conscious responsibility of both nuclear super- 
powers.
The signing of the treaty was of great political significance to both parties. 
The United States perceived it as an important step within “resetting” the rela-
tions with Russia, while the latter viewed the negotiations and their positive 
result as a confirmation of its own prestige and its status of an equal partner of 
the USA.26 The political context was additionally strengthened by the verifica-
tion mechanisms aimed at building trust. The most important of them assumed 
an exchange of telemetric data on test flights of new rocket missiles, inspections 
in the bases where the weapons governed by the treaty were distributed and 
giving special identification labels to mobile missile launch systems. The treaty 
was adopted as binding for ten years (till 2021) and can be extended by five 
years.
The seven-year period of strategic nuclear weapon reduction as declared by 
both states expired in 2018. Therefore, it is suitable to sum up the treaty effects 
and analyse the obtained results.
the number of nuclear warheads was to be reduced to 1700—2200 pieces for either party till 
31 December 2012. SORT also confirmed the validity of START I.
23 The Treaty Between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, art. II, 
par. 1.
24 Distributed warheads are those installed on delivery means or located in the bases 
where operationally ready nuclear forces are stationed.
25 A heavy bomber is one which has a range exceeding eight thousand km and/or is 
equipped with a nuclear long-range strategic air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). It is inter-
esting that the parties defined a heavy bomber for nuclear weapon verification purposes as 
a bomber carrying one load regardless of its real capabilities. Source: Protocol to the Treaty 
Between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Fur-
ther Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Part One.
26 Z. Lachowski: Nuklearne rozbrojenie i nieproliferacja: geneza, stan i perspektywy. 
“Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 2012, nr 22, II, p. 72.
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Table 1

















The USA 882 1,124 1,800 656 800 1,365
Russia 521 865 1,537 524 760 1,461
Developed by the author.
Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance: 
February 2011, March 201927.
The presented data show that the United States and Russia fulfilled the ob-
ligations they had assumed. However, New START concerned only a part of 
the strategic nuclear arsenal, albeit that was the key part for the bilateral ne-
gotiations. One should highlight that every ICBM can deliver several nuclear 
warheads, while the SLBM distributed on submarines are considered as the 
first-strike weapon owing to the element of surprise. Unfortunately, due to the 
limitations introduced in the treaty, the latter has not significantly affected the 
total amount of the nuclear weapon owned by both superpowers. According to 
the data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United 
States still have 6,450 warheads at their disposal, including 1,750 operationally 
ready ones, while Russia owns 6,850 warheads, 1,60028 of which are operation-
ally ready. The continued existence of such big arsenals (they jointly constitute 
91% of the world’s resources of strategic nuclear weapons) lets certain nuclear 
states, especially China, use this disproportion29 to marginalise the significance 
of their own nuclear weapons during disarmament talks.
Considering the significance of New START, one must underline that, till 
its expiration in 2021, it will be the only treaty30 between the United States and 
Russia allowing for information exchange regarding the amount of the strategic 
nuclear weapon owned by the two states. If New START is not extended, one 
can forecast that the negative effect will be the impossibility of data exchange 
between both states concerning the size, development and modernisation of their 
27 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/164722.htm; https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/
290759.htm (accessed: 4.05.2019).
28 SIPRI Yearbook 2018 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, p. 11.
29 The nuclear resources of the remaining countries (as of 2018): France — 300 warheads, 
China — 280, Great Britain — 215, India — 130—140, Pakistan — 140—150, Israel — 80, 
North Korea — 10—20. Ibidem.
30 In February 2019, the United States and subsequently Russia commenced their with-
drawal from the INF Treaty (Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces), which imposes 
complete elimination of intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
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nuclear arsenals. One is also justified in fearing that, once the limitations stem-
ming from the treaty are abolished, Russia will strive to increase the potential 
of its Strategic Nuclear Forces. The signs auguring this include i.a. plans of pro-
viding the army with additional RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles 
which can deliver “Avangard” hypersonic systems as well as replacing the older 
RS-12M1 Topol-M missiles with modern ones — RS-24 Yars.31
Regardless of strategic arsenals, the significance of which gradually dimin-
ishes (predominantly due to the low probability of using nuclear loads with 
a big or very big power), the United States, Russia and the remaining nuclear 
states have tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) at their disposal. TNW parameters 
make it suitable for use during combat operations on a limited (tactical) scale. 
The significant properties in this case are: a limited range of 450—500 km and 
a relatively small power. This is clearly visible in comparison with thermonu-
clear weapons: the striking power of the latter is expressed in megatons and 
their tactical load of 15—20 kilotons is comparable with the bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.32
A combination of numerous factors has contributed to the increase in sig-
nificance of this weapon category, which raises a growing number of concerns 
in Europe, especially the Baltic states and Poland. First, it must be stressed that 
tactical nuclear weapons have not been a subject of any disarmament treaty 
yet33. Consequently, no official data exist regarding their real resources in vari-
ous countries. Nevertheless, Russia is believed to be a TNW tycoon because it 
31 Information note of 6 June 2019 by the Defence Attaché in Moscow (this article does 
not state the planned quantities of the abovementioned armament types or the names of the 
army units supposed to receive this equipment). The Sarmat ballistic missile weighs approx. 
100 tons and can deliver up to 16 combat warheads with a power of two megatons each to 
the distance of 18 thousand km. The RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile can deliver 
up to six combat warheads with a power of 300 kilotons each to the distance of approx. 11 
thousand km.
32 The classification of tactical nuclear weapons according to their load power is relative 
because the value bracket is very diversified, ranging from less than one kiloton to as many 
as 50 kt. Russia’s Raduga Kh-22 missiles are adapted to deliver warheads of 1 Mt, which 
exceeds the “norms” for TNW many times.
33 Attempts to regulate the TNW issue are known as Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 
(PNI), which were informal unilateral actions taken in 1992. President of the USA G. Bush 
Senior and then President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev obliged to have their 
respective countries destroy significant amounts of the TNW stockpiled in their arsenals. 
However, those initiatives had no verification mechanisms, so it is hard to determine nowa-
days whether all of their obligations have been fulfilled and how many pieces of such weap-
ons remain at the disposal of both states. The TNW negotiation attempts made by the admi- 
nistration of B. Obama in June 2013 also failed because Russia conditioned commencing 
the talks on meeting a number of conditions unacceptable to the United States, i.a. complete 
withdrawal of American B-61 nuclear bombs from Europe, giving up the construction of the 
Ballistic Missile Defence in the Central and Eastern Europe and including the nuclear poten-
tial of Great Britain in the negotiations.
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traditionally perceives tactical nuclear weapons as a way of counterbalancing 
the economic, scientific and technological advantage of the United States and 
the North Atlantic Alliance Member States. Russia is estimated to possess ap-
prox. two thousand non-strategic warheads allocated to the individual types of 
its armed forces.34 An additional trump card of Moscow is the wide series of 
delivery means which includes mobile missile launch systems, artillery, aircraft, 
torpedoes, depth charges and mines. The difficulties in determining the number 
of the Russian systems which deliver non-strategic nuclear weapons stem i.a. 
from their dual use. Most of those systems lack the characteristic external fea-
tures which allow the experts to distinguish between conventional and nuclear 
variants.
Russian tactical nuclear weapons are constantly modernised in order to in-
crease their CEP and range with a simultaneous reduction of their manufactur-
ing and operation costs35. This is clearly disproportionate to the amount of the 
American non-strategic nuclear weapons distributed in Europe. It is worth re-
minding that, after withdrawing selected armament systems from the continent 
in the 1990s, the resources are estimated to reach approx. 150 pieces. These 
include B-61 gravity bombs with adjustable power (approx. 0.3 to 150 kilotons) 
distributed in five NATO Member States: Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Turkey and Italy. When analysing the risk posed by the contemporary tactical 
nuclear weapon, one must consider not only its amount, but also, or maybe first 
and foremost, the role it plays in the military doctrines of the states which have 
it at their disposal, especially Russia and the United States.
The provisions on nuclear weapons included in the binding military doctrine 
of the Russian Federation of December 2014 coincide with the relevant views 
expressed in the previous doctrine (2010). The current doctrine states that “[pre-
vention] of a nuclear military conflict . . . is the basis of the military policy of the 
Russian Federation”. Nonetheless, the main tasks in the scope of deterring and 
preventing military conflicts include maintaining “the nuclear deterrence poten-
tial at a sufficient level.”36 Moreover, “[the] Russian Federation shall reserve the 
right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of 
weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of 
34 The probable allocation of TNW to the types of the armed forces is as follows: air 
force: approx. 730 loads delivered by suitably adapted planes (Tu-22M3 Backfire-C, Su-24M 
Fencer, Su-34 Fullback, Su-25 Frogfoot and Su-30 Flanker-C); navy: approx. 700 loads (rocket 
missiles, rocket-assisted torpedoes, torpedoes and depth charges) distributed on submarines 
and surface combatants; air defence forces: approx. 430 loads (ground-to-air missile systems, 
antiballistic systems); land forces: approx. 170 loads delivered by mobile missile launch sys-
tems — SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) and SS-26 Stone (Iskander).
35 Note of 19 June 2019 by the Defence Attaché in Washington.
36 The military doctrine of the Russian Federation, clause 20 and 21c — https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20150721195150/ (accessed: 28.05.2019); http://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 
(accessed: 28.05.2019).
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aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons 
when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”37 The unsettling aspect here 
is both the mere possibility of using nuclear weapons in conventional combat 
operations — an act of this kind would completely change the nature of a con-
flict — and the unclear definition of the circumstances authorising such a deci-
sion, which is a prerogative of the President of the Russian Federation.
When the conflict in Ukraine began, the Russian nuclear threats intensified. 
They were intended to underline that in case attempts were made to return Cri-
mea to Ukraine by force, Russia possessed diversified and effective retaliation 
assets and tactical nuclear weapons played a significant role among them. This 
narrative is visible in the statements of the persons holding key political and 
military positions, i.a. President Vladimir Putin38 and Chief of the General Staff 
of the Armed Forces of Russia Valery Gerasimov.39
A manifestation of this nuclear determination is so-called de-escalation nu-
clear strike scenario. It has not been officially confirmed, but the mere presump-
tions emerging in relation to it have aroused a feeling of uncertainty in the world. 
It is believed, among other things, that Russia may decide to detonate a tactical 
nuclear load in the territory of a state which does not possess a nuclear arsenal. 
This would take place at the initial stage of a conflict. Taking into account the 
geographical location of Poland and the current political and military conditions, 
the hazard for that country is obvious. The aim of such an attack would be to 
discourage the NATO Member States, especially Western Europe, from sup-
porting their attacked ally, and therefore to end the conflict on the conditions 
imposed by Moscow. From the Russian point of view, this would be a specific 
“de-escalation.”
It is also highly probable that Russia practised the use of various nuclear 
weapon delivery means and even mock attacks on targets located in enemy ter-
ritory during the cyclically held Zapad military exercise (2013, 2017). European 
capital cities, beginning with Warsaw and Vilnius, are listed in this context (an 
attack on Warsaw is visualised in Fig. 2). Experts also mention facilities of stra-
tegic importance in Sweden.
37 Ibidem, clause 27.
38 For example, in August 2014 in Yalta, Putin announced that he would soon “surprise 
the West with . . . new developments in offensive nuclear weapons”. At a meeting with young 
people the same month, he stressed that Russia “was strengthening its military and nuclear 
potential” and that “Russia was one of the most powerful nuclear states” — https://www.
tvp.info/16832858/putin-testuje-rakiete-i-straszy-bronia-atomowa-nuklearny-atak-mozliwy-
ekspert-w-zasadzie-tak (accessed: 2.06.2019).
39 In December 2016, during a meeting with the military attachés accredited to Russia, 
General Valery Gerasimov stated that in 2016, “the main efforts of the Ministry of Defence 
focused on maintaining the nuclear potential” — https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-
swiata,2/rosja-armia-poswieci-szczegolna-uwage-strategicznej-broni-jadrowej,700059.html 
(accessed: 2.06.2019).
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Fig. 2. The forecast contamination after a hypothetical nuclear strike on Warsaw.
Developed by the author using “Promień” — an electronic contamination forecasting and 
assessment system. Map scale: 1: 500 thousand.
Assumptions: explosion site (ground zero) — the Śląsko-Dąbrowski bridge, load power — 20 kilotons, 
averaged wind direction in the upper layers of the atmosphere — 320 degrees, effective wind speed — 
42 km/h.
The calculations show that the most tragic effects of the attack would take 
place inside a virtual circle with a radius of approx. 3.4 km and ground zero as 
the centre. It is predicted that over 90% of the population present in the area 
would be harmed at the moment of the attack, 43% of whom would die; further 
deaths would take place within the first six months and later.40 Taking into ac-
count that the average population density in the city centre (Śródmieście dis-
trict — the explosion site) is 7,515 people per km2, i.e. nearly two times higher 
than the Warsaw average (3,412 people per km2),41 the only possible conclusion 
is that the attack would cause a humanitarian disaster requiring international 
help.
One must also stress that buildings in the area, including those with rein-
forced concrete structures, would be destroyed or damaged and their collapsed 
remnants would create continuous or local obstacles to the rescue service equip-
ment. A separate hazard would be posed by spot and area fires (second- and 
third-degree burns of the human body) as well as destruction of heating devices 
and power and gas supply systems.
40 Calculation basis: Metodyki prognozowania i oceny strat w rejonach uderzeń 
jądrowych. Warszawa 1991, p. 21—23 and 70—71.
41 „Przegląd Statystyczny Warszawy” 2018, nr 1, table 6, p. 39.
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Another parameter characterising a nuclear explosion is ionising radiation 
and radioactive fallout which spreads downwind, thus causing radioactive con-
tamination in the area situated far away from the epicentre. In the analysed 
example, two contamination zones would be formed: zone I — 32 km, zone 
II — 64 km.42 Their shape is presented in the figure.
The current stance of the United States on nuclear issues43 was published 
in Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in February 2018. The significance of NPR 
is proved by its publishing in the initial period of the term of office served by 
a new president. The document contains the most important arrangements con-
cerning the nuclear policy of the United States, including the nuclear weapon 
use strategy and arsenal modernisation plans.
In NPR 2018, the administration of Donald Trump states that returning to 
the idea of nuclear deterrence in the scope adequate to diagnosed hazards is 
the priority. The greatest hazards indicated in the document are: the readiness 
manifested by Russia to use non-strategic nuclear weapons at the initial stage 
of a conflict and Russian expansion and modernisation programmes concerning 
delivery means.44 The changes in NPR 2018 are also justified with lack of trans-
parency in the nuclear policy of China, which “possesses nuclear warheads… 
and nuclear-armed, theatre-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching [US] ter-
ritory, allies, partners, forces, and bases in the region.”45 The document also 
highlights the increasing activity of Chinese army in the area of South China 
Sea and the territorial claims of that superpower toward its neighbours. The 
Central State is accused of conducting secret nuclear tests of loads with a small 
and very small power and probably (author’s note) “having implemented a pro-
gramme of fast expansion and diversification of the nuclear arsenal, allowing it 
to double its resources of this weapon during the next decade.”46
Another state mentioned in the NPR is North Korea, the armament policy of 
which has raised justified concerns in recent years. One should recall the accel-
42 Unprotected persons exposed to ionising radiation in zone I may absorb a dose equal 
to or exceeding 150 cGy in less than four hours of the moment they are reached by the 
radioactive fallout. The total dose absorbed by unprotected persons exposed to the radia-
tion in zone II should not exceed 150 cGy in the first four hours of the moment they are 
reached by the radioactive fallout; it is simultaneously assumed that the dose would exceed 
50 cGy within 24 hours. Persons staying outside zone I and II may absorb a radiation dose 
not exceeding 50 cGy within 24 hours of the moment they are reached by the cloud; the total 
dose till the radiation fades would not exceed 150 cGy. Source: Metodyka oceny sytuacji 
skażeń chemicznych, biologicznych i promieniotwórczych. Warszawa 2013, p. 200.
43 The previous Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, drafted by the administration of 
B. Obama, is mentioned on page 8 of this article.
44 https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTU
RE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed: 14.06.2019).
45 Ibidem, p. 31—32.
46 Information note of 4 June 2019 by the Defence Attaché in India, New Delhi, p. 1.
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eration of its nuclear programme and the fiasco of the meetings between Trump 
and Kim Jong Un concerning i.a. denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (June 
2018, February 2019). An equally significant hazard to international security is 
still posed by Iran, against which the United States restored economic sanctions 
in May 2019.47 The dynamics of the events concerning the Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme manifest itself in the fact that on 7 July 2019, Iran announced returning 
to uranium enrichment above the 3.67% threshold defined in the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action of 14 July 2015.
Nuclear Posture Review has the nature of a doctrine and contains the official 
stance of the American administration on the possible use of the nuclear arsenal. 
Like the previous reviews, NPR 2018 confirms the principle of “no first use” 
against the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and have ratified the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and observe its provisions. At the same 
time, it permits using nuclear weapons in response to attacks with chemical and 
biological weapons as well as, which is a novelty in the NPR, cyberattacks aim-
ing at the US nuclear systems, critical infrastructure, commanding systems etc. 
That clause broadens the scope of the possible nuclear response in comparison 
with NPR 2010, which excluded such possibility. It refers to the assumptions of 
G. Bush’s nuclear doctrine of 2002, which was dominated by the prevention of 
and defence against terrorist attacks, including chemical and biological ones. 
The NPR from that period indicated the states belonging to “the axis of evil” 
(Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya) as potential targets of an Ameri-
can nuclear attack. It also allowed for the use of small-power nuclear loads to 
destroy underground bunkers and fortified depots of biological and chemical 
weapons.
The 2018 Review announces the planned modernisation of all the nuclear 
triad elements: ICBM, heavy bombers and SLBM-delivering submarines. The 
modernisation is divided into stages. First, it is planned to reduce the warhead 
power in selected Trident II D-5 submarine-launched missiles to adjust them to 
tactical use. It is simultaneously assumed that new versions of F-35 and B-21 
planes as well as nuclear-armed long-range stand-off (LRSO) cruise missiles 
integrated with them will be commissioned for use in the army in the middle of 
the 2020s. Moreover, long-term plans (7—10 years) provide for equipping US 
Navy again with sea-based self-controlled missiles.
Analysing the contemporary conditions of nuclear deterrence requires pre-
senting the stance of the North Atlantic Alliance, which was most comprehen-
sively expressed in the NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué. The introduc-
tory part contains an assessment of contemporary hazards; a separate paragraph 
47 On 14 July 2015 in Vienna, the P5+1 (the USA, China, Russia, France, Great Britain 
and Germany) concluded a nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), after 12 years of negotiations. Iran obliged to stop the works on its nuclear 
programme in exchange for the abolition of economic sanctions.
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(clause 10) is devoted to “Russia’s destabilising actions and policies,” which in-
clude i.a. “its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric.”48 The strategic goal 
of the Alliance defined in the Communiqué is the strengthening of deterrence 
and defence “based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile 
defence capabilities.” A combination of these elements should counterbalance 
the arsenals of potential enemies. The document unambiguously states that “[as] 
long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”49
Implications of WMD proliferation for international relations
In the present decade of the 21st century, proliferation is considered first and 
foremost in the context of the actions taken by selected states and organisations 
(i.a. terrorist ones) in order to acquire WMD or the technologies and compo-
nents necessary for its manufacture.
A possible way of applying the acquired assets would be a CBRN terrorist 
attack: chemical (chemical terrorism), biological (biological terrorism), radio-
logical or nuclear, the latter also referred to as superterrorism, grand terrorism 
or catastrophic terrorism in order to highlight the effect of a hypothetical at-
tack, which would reach hundreds of casualties (or more) in certain conditions. 
Depending on the target of an attack and the manner of its conducting, CBRN 
terrorism variants also include agriterrorism, which destroys agricultural crops, 
and zooterrorism, which causes losses of farm animals.50 Both types result in 
significant losses suffered by the economy of an attacked state.
The most spectacular act of CBRN terrorism was conducted in 1995 in the 
Tokyo underground by a Japanese sect called Aum Shinrikyō (Supreme Truth): 
12 people died and approx. 5,500 were harmed, including approx. 50 severely 
harmed. After that event, counteracting the hazards of this type became the top 
priority.
One must underline that CBRN assets constitute a very dangerous weapon 
of diversified action when used by the perpetrators. They allow the attackers to 
manifest their ruthlessness and cause fear, dread and multi-faceted psychologi-
cal effects among victims. The list of operational advantages is completed by the 
48 Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government partici-
pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8—9 July 2016, p. 3.
49 Ibidem, p. 12.
50 The list of the most hazardous biological agents contains 18 animal and 19 plant 
pathogens, including the bird flu virus, the classical swine fever (CSF) virus and the cattle 
plague virus. See more in: B. Michailiuk: Broń biologiczna jako zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa 
państwa. Warszawa 2015, p. 330—332.
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possibility of surprise (a hidden attack) and difficulties in detecting, identifying 
and proving an act of terror; this concerns especially bioterrorism.51
The WMD proliferation problem is in the centre of attention of the United 
Nations, the European Union,52 numerous international authorities, individual 
states and groups of states, i.a. the Visegrad Group.53
WMD proliferation, development and research has been criticised by Vatican 
many times. During a conference entitled “Perspectives for a World Free from 
Nuclear Weapons and for Integral Disarmament,” held in November 2017, Pope 
Francis underlined, “International relations cannot be dominated by military 
strength [or] mutual intimidation… Weapons of mass destruction, particularly 
atomic, create nothing more than a false sense of security and cannot constitute 
the basis of peaceful coexistence between members of the human family.”54 
President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda referred three times to 
the proliferation of WMD, especially chemical and nuclear weapons, during his 
speeches at the UN Security Council in January, May and September 2018. The 
President considered counteracting that hazard “as an important element of the 
51 See more in: W. Wątor: Terroryzm CBRN — wyzwanie dla służb i administracji 
publicznej. W: Wyzwania i zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego i narodowe-
go pod koniec drugiej dekady XXI wieku. Red. K. Czornik, M. Szynol. Katowice 2017, 
p. 219—245, and W. Wątor: Przeciwdziałanie terroryzmowi CBRN w świetle prawa pol-
skiego. W: Zarządzanie kryzysowe w aspekcie zagrożeń terrorystycznych. Red. B. Michail-
iuk, J. Solarz, J. Stempień. Warszawa 2019, p. 213—232.
52 The EU stance on proliferation is included in the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2003. In December 2008, the EU adopted 
a new document entitled New Lines of Action by the European Union in Combating the 
Proliferation of WMD. It aims at facilitating operational cooperation in combating the pro- 
liferation of WMD by: (a) turning non-proliferation into a cross-cutting priority of EU and 
the Member States’ policies; (b) identifying the existing best practice of combating the pro- 
liferation to encourage the spread of such practice in the Member States; (c) encouraging 
better coordination of the Member States’ national policies and of existing EU tools and 




53 An example of such action was the strategic workshop of the Visegrad Group states 
in 2013. In one of its thematic blocks, entitled “Security environment in the perspective of 
10—15 years”, the proliferation of WMD and its delivery means was acknowledged as one of 
the main hazards. “Responsibility for a Strong NATO”, a declaration of the Visegrad Group 
of 18 April 2012, indicates CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) defence as 
one of the projects enabling so-called smart defence. See more in: R. Kupiecki: Visegrad 
Defence Cooperation: From Mutual Support to Strengthening NATO and the EU. A Polish 
Perspective. Report No. 35. Centre for European Policy, 2013, p. 4—6, DAV4 Full Report. 





Polish security policy.”55 Referring to the gas attacks in Syria and the attempt 
at murdering S. Skripal in Great Britain, the President stated, “Every use of 
a chemical weapon is a crime. It does not matter whether it is used on a mass 
scale by non-democratic regimes against their own peoples… or during an act 
of national terrorism.”56 Concerning nuclear weapon proliferation, the President 
stressed its negative impact on the security level in the Central and Eastern 
Europe.57
Poland’s increased activity concerning proliferation prevention is related 
to its term of office as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council 
in 2018—2019. Poland’s involvement was also visible last year when it chaired 
the works of the Preparatory Committee to the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Review Conference as well as the sessions of the International Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the Hague Code of Conduct, 
HCOC).
The basis for combating the proliferation is international agreements devoted 
to individual WMD types. They demonstrate significant diversification, from 
the genesis of their conclusion,58 via their purpose, the obligations of the signing 
states and the control and verification mechanisms included, to their effective-
ness. They also vary in their universality indicators, expressed as the number of 
states which have signed and ratified a given agreement or remain beyond them 
(table 2).
55 Speech of the President of the Republic of Poland during a High-Level Debate of 
the UN Security Council on 17 May 2018 — https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowie 
dzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/art,420,wystapienie-prezydenta-rp-andrzeja-dudy-podczas- 
debaty-wysokiego-szczebla-rady-bezpieczenstwa-onz.html (accessed: 16.06.2019).
56 Speech of the President of the Republic of Poland at a meeting of the UN Security
Council on 26 September 2018 — https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezyden 
ta-rp/wystapienia/art,531,wystapienie-podczas-posiedzenia-rady-bezpieczenstwa-onz.html 
(accessed: 16.06.2019).
57 This is confirmed by the following speech fragment: “Within the last few years alone, 
we have witnessed an evident breach of the Budapest Memorandum, which guaranteed the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for a peaceful and voluntary denuclearisation of 
that country. We have also heard of using nuclear weapons to end conventional conflicts. 
The distribution of dual-use assets and technologies close to our borders has been equally 
alarming. All those actions have significantly contributed to a deterioration of the security 
environment”. Ibidem.
58 The first regulations in international law concern biological and chemical weapons. 
One should note that, on 17 June 1925, on the initiative of the head of Polish delegation, 
Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases was broadened to include bacteriological methods 
of warfare.
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Table 2
The legal status of WMD agreements in selected countries59
  The CWC  Convention
The BTWC  
















Arabia signed, ratified signed, ratified signed, ratified not signed
not  
signed
Egypt not signed signed, not ratified signed, ratified signed, ratified
Iran signed, ratified signed, ratified signed, ratified signed, not ratified
Israel signed, not ratified not signed not signed
signed, not 
ratified
Syria signed, ratified (2013)
signed, not 
ratified signed, ratified not signed
India signed, ratified signed, ratified not signed not signed
not  
signed






of the Treaty 
(2003)
not signed
Saerce: Developed by the author.
The table shows that the Middle East is the centre of the WMD prolifera-
tion problems. The elevated WMD-related risk in that region is indicated by the 
number of states which have not obliged to observe the abovementioned inter-
national agreements as well as the permanent inter-state and internal tensions.60 
Despite the actions taken by the international community since the turn of the 
1960s and 1970s, the Middle East has not become a WMD-free zone. Many 
signs show that it will be difficult to reach an agreement on establishing such 
a zone in the oncoming years, too.
When analysing the influence of WMD on the contemporary international 
relations, one should highlight the case of Syria. When the conflict commenced 
in 2011, Syria possessed over a thousand tons of toxic warfare agents (TWA) 
characterised by high toxicity: yperite, sarin and VX. As the fights escalated, 
59 CWC — the Chemical Weapons Convention, BTWC — the Convention on the Pro-
hibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons, NPT — the Non-Proliferation Treaty, CTBT — the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty, TPNW — Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
60 According to a 2018 report by SIPRI, the main conflicts taking place in the Middle 
East and North Africa involve Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria, Turkey and Yemen. See the 
SIPRI Yearbook 2018..., p. 3.
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concerns emerged that a part of the TWA might be seized by Islamist groups 
and that the Syrian army could use chemical weapons to break the enemy’s re-
sistance.61 In August 2012, B. Obama warned President Bashar al-Assad that the 
United States would react should he decide to conduct a chemical attack. The 
warning evoked associations with the situation preceding the 2003 intervention 
in Iraq, the pretext for which was the announced intention to destroy Saddam 
Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.
In August 2013, the international community was shocked by the news 
of a gas attack in Damascus which killed approx. 1,400 civilians. Though al-
Assad’s regime consistently denied having conducted that and the subsequent 
chemical attacks,62 the tragedy suffered by the victims and the pressure put by 
the international public opinion led to intense talks between the heads of di-
plomacy of the United States and Russia. They resulted in an agreement on the 
Syrian chemical weapons, concluded by both States on 14 September 2013 in 
Geneva. Under the agreement, Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention 
on the same month and its TWA resources were to be completely destroyed in 
2014. Due to the complexity and costs of destroying such a big amount of highly 
toxic chemical substances, six countries participated in the destruction of the 
Syrian chemical weapons. The United States made available their special ship 
named “Cape Ray”, on which TWA disposal took place for safety reasons. Ger-
many ensured the destruction of several hundred tons of the hydrolysate gener-
ated by the yperite decomposition process. Great Britain, Finland, Denmark and 
Norway were responsible for the transport and neutralisation of selected chemi-
cal substances.63
The destruction of Syria’s TWA, officially confirmed on 4 September 2014 
by Sigrid Kaag, head of the mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, was not equivalent to excluding the possible application of 
other available chemical substances for military purposes. About a dozen gas 
attacks, which probably utilised chlorine,64 were recorded in the years 2014—
61 See more in: M. Szybalski: Broń chemiczna w syryjskiej wojnie domowej 2011—
2018. “Biuletyn CSOPBMR” 2018, nr 2(14), p. 2.
62 Only two years after the attack, on 7 July 2015, did the UN Security Council pass 
a resolution aimed at determining the perpetrators who had used the chemical weapon in 
Syria in 2013. The USA, Great Britain and France blamed the Syrian army for the attack, 
while Russia, which supports al-Assad, highlighted that there was no irrefutable evidence of 
the government’s blame available.
63 S. Król: Broń chemiczna w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. „Biuletyn CSOPBMR” 2016, 
nr 6(16), p. 3.
64 Chlorine — a green-coloured gas which becomes yellow when liquefied. Its unpleas-
ant, sharp scent is perceptible already at a 1:100,000 dilution ratio. It is applied in numerous 
syntheses of the chemical industry as well as a whitening agent in the textile and paper indus-
tries. It is also used to disinfect water and wastewater. It has a destructive action on metals, 
certain plastics, rubber and protective coatings. The mechanism of its toxic action consists 
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2018. News agencies worldwide pointed at merely two such cases, of 7 April 
2017 and 14 April 2018, mainly due to the retaliation strikes of the American, 
British and French forces at the Shayrat Airbase and selected Syrian scientific 
and military facilities.
The data presented in table 2, though limited to selected states, are rep-
resentative and clearly demonstrate the difficulties in the WMD disarmament 
process.
Another unresolved problem is the nuclear test ban. The Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty signed in 1996 has not entered into force yet. In order 
to become valid, it has to be ratified by the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to the 
Treaty which are capable of generating nuclear energy or possess research reac-
tors. Consequently, though the Treaty has been signed by 184 states (and ratified 
by 168 states, including 3665 from the abovementioned group of 44 states), the 
lack of ratification i.a. by the states listed in the table prevents it from entering 
into force.
The identical stances of India and Pakistan toward the abovementioned 
agreements, including those concerning nuclear weapons, stem from the excep-
tional significance those two states have ascribed to this weapon category in 
mutual deterrence. The phenomenon in question dates back to 1988, when both 
countries nearly simultaneously conducted series of nuclear tests (India: five ex-
plosions66 on 11 and 13 May, Pakistan: two to five explosions on 28 May and 
one explosion on 30 May), therefore joining the nuclear superpowers club. The 
nuclear weapon development programmes were, and still are, justified by the 
Kashmir conflict, which has lasted for over 70 years and caused three full-scale 
wars, a number of skirmishes and a serious test of strength in 1999, the latter 
entailing a hazard of a nuclear strike exchange.
The region around the Line of Control, which is seven hundred kilometres 
long and separates the armies of both parties, is one of the most heavily milita-
rised places in the world due to the forces which station there (approx. 100 thou-
sand soldiers of either party). Despite the official truce agreement of 2003, the 
Line of Control sees several dozen military incidents annually which may turn 
into an open conflict. The risk is increased by the activity of the Islamic sepa-
ratist groups supported by Pakistan which have conducted a number of bomb 
attacks on the Indian military and civilian targets in recent years. The latest 
attack on an Indian military convoy, conducted by Islamic radicals from Jaish-
mainly in the creation of hydrogen chloride when gaseous chlorine comes into contact with 
moist mucous membranes and the skin, oxygen free radicals and other chlorine compounds 
exerting a strong biological action.
65 https://www.ctbto.org/ (accessed: 2.07.2019).
66 The first Indian nuclear test was code-named “Smiling Buddha” and took place in 
May 1974 (a plutonium load with a power of 12—15 kT or, according to American estima-
tions, four to six kilotons). The subsequent Indian nuclear tests were conducted in 1988.
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e-Mohammed (Muhammad’s Army), killed 40 soldiers and triggered air fights 
during which both armies shot down the enemy’s planes.
When assessing the hazard stemming from India’s and Pakistan’s posses-
sion of nuclear weapons, one should underline several significant factors. First, 
their nuclear arsenals have been maintained on the same acceptable level for 
years (approx. 130—140 warheads in India and approx. 140—150 warheads in 
Pakistan)67 to ensure so-called credible minimum deterrence. Second, there are 
doctrinal differences concerning nuclear weapon application. India has obliged 
not to use it first, but it will not hesitate to apply it in retaliation for the enemy’s 
nuclear attack. Pakistan, the conventional potential of which is much smaller 
than that of its eastern neighbour, allows for a spoiling attack. Moreover, the 
decision-making cycle is very vaguely defined. Taking into account the role of 
the army in that country and the exceptional position of the chief commanders, 
one can assume that a decision to use nuclear weapons will be made within 
their circles. Third, the countries are neighbours, so a possible flight of a nucle-
ar-warhead missile will last only several minutes, making the verification and 
warning systems of little use in such case. Moreover, the probable adjustment 
of the Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons to be delivered by Haft-9 short-range 
missiles (their range is approx. 60 km), which are distributed close to the Line of 
Control, may confirm the existence of an option referred to as “use them or lose 
them.” It permits launching a combat missile when it is threatened with seizure 
by an enemy conducting a fast-paced attack. This means a radical lowering of 
the decision-making threshold concerning missile use, probably to the level of 
tactical formation commanders.
The status of North Korea is symptomatic: it is the only country in the world 
which has not obliged to observe most WMD-related agreements (table 2). Be-
side its nuclear programme which attracts the public opinion’s attention, North 
Korea is accused of not only possessing chemical and biological weapons, but 
also contributing to their dissemination. This information is hard to verify be-
cause the DPRK remains outside of the international agreements and therefore 
does not declare its resources or precursors to the manufacture of those weapons 
as well as refuses to undergo controls by specialised authorities. In such situ-
ation, all analyses are based on materials coming from satellite and electronic 
reconnaissance. However, their significance is limited because North Korea has 
obtained the operational masking capabilities and dispersed its secret research 
and manufacturing centres. Data verification via intelligence actions is practi-
cally impossible due to the incredibly elaborate control of the North Korean 
regime over the society.
Among the selected facts available, one must first and foremost highlight the 
murder of Kim Jong Nam, a stepbrother of the DPRK leader, carried out using 
67 SIPRI Yearbook 2018 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, p. 11.
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a toxic warfare agent called VX at the Kuala Lumpur airport in February 2017. 
The United States blamed the government in Pyongyang for the assassination 
and toughened the sanctions imposed on North Korea. This was criticised by 
Russia, which underlined lack of proof of DPRK participation in the murder. 
Another significant event concerning the North Korean activity in the field of 
chemical weapons was the publishing of a United Nations report in February 
2018. The document contains information about approx. 40 shipments of forbid-
den components used in chemical weapon production which the DPRK handed 
over to Syria in the years 2012—2017.68
The presented examples confirm that the chemical weapon proliferation 
combating system, which receives the highest marks of all the WMD categories, 
must not be viewed as fully infallible. This also pertains to the protection of 
important facilities viewed as potential targets for a chemical attack (chemical 
terrorism). Places where huge numbers of people are present simultaneously and 
air circulation is forced (railway and underground stations, sports venues etc.) 
are particularly susceptible to this type of attacks. The abovementioned exam-
ples also prove how much attention the international community pays to every 
incident of using or trading in hazardous substances and how hard it is to prove 
such activity in a manner which raises no doubts.
The most recent nuclear weapon agreement is the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted on 7 July 2017 during the 72nd session of 
the United Nations General Assembly. The Treaty preamble particularly empha-
sizes the humanitarian, health-related, legal and environmental effects stemming 
from the presence of nuclear weapons in the world and their possible (including 
unintended) use. The adoption of the Treaty raises an analogy with the Hu-
manitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative (the Humanitarian Initiative), 
which was announced during the NPT Preparatory Committee conferences in 
2013 and 2014. It was supported by 155 countries, while five states objected — 
the latter are the permanent members of the UN Security Council and possess 
nuclear weapons. The difficulties accompanying TPNW acceptance were sig-
nalled already by the voting results regarding a resolution by the UN Security 
Council on TNPW negotiations (December 2016). Though the resolution itself 
was eventually passed, as many as 30% of states voted against it or abstained 
from voting.
The controversy surrounding TPNW from the very beginning is well re-
flected by the voting result: 122 states voted for the Treaty, one (the Netherlands) 
voted against, one (Singapore) abstained from voting and 69 refused to vote. It 
is characteristic that the latter group included all the states possessing nuclear 
weapons and the North Atlantic Alliance Member States except the Netherlands 




50 states to enter into force. Thus far, it has been ratified by only 13 states. The 
comprehensive obligation not to “develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise 
acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” 
or to possess, transfer, use or threaten to use them69 is a truly lofty goal. What 
has prevented it from winning widespread approval? This question seems justi-
fied, especially because the nuclear weapon elimination idea is already 73 years 
old: the first resolution of the UN General Assembly on this matter was passed 
on 24 January 1946.
The lack of a compromise regarding the treaty may be justified in a simplify-
ing manner by the different views of the individual countries, especially nuclear 
states, on the role of this weapon category in their own (or their allies’) military 
doctrines and the current progress of the disarmament process. The stances of 
the United States, Russia and NATO Member States are crucial in this case. The 
United States, like Great Britain and France, believe that the vision of a world 
free from nuclear weapons is presently unrealistic. The most common argument 
cited to support this thesis is the nuclear programme development in North Ko-
rea. An alternative for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the 
involvement of the United States in advocating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.70 Russia believes that TPNW is “formulated one-sidedly and directed 
against it.”71 According to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, 
“the possibility of a complete nuclear disarmament exists only on condition that 
all countries, including nuclear weapon owners, are provided with equal, indi-
visible and full-scope protection.”72 The stance of the North Atlantic Alliance, 
presented in October 2017 by Secretary General J. Stoltenberg, comes down to 
a statement that “the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons does not 
bring us closer to our goal — a world without nuclear weapons. It can actually 
threaten the progress we have made throughout the years in the field of nu-
clear disarmament and non-proliferation.”73 It is interesting that such an opinion 
was expressed directly after awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to an organisation 
named International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN).74 The No-
69 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, art. 1 — http://www.icanw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/TPNW-English1.pdf (accessed: 12.07.2019).
70 Statement by UN Ambassador N. Haley of 27 March 2017 — https://www.polsatnews.pl/
wiadomosc/2017-03-27/rozmowy-onz-o-zakazie-broni-atomowej-bez-usa-wielkiej-brytanii- 
i-francji/ (accessed: 20.06.2019).






74 ICAN is an association of non-governmental organisations conducting a campaign to 
support the actions aimed at a comprehensive ban on the possession, production and stockpil-
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bel Committee stated that the organisation had received the prize “for its work 
to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of 
nuclear weapons and for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based 
prohibition of such weapons.”75
The most important cause of the limited results achieved by the activities 
concerning WMD proliferation prevention and elimination is the impossibility 
of conducting effective verification and control of the adherence to international 
agreements. The most elaborate control mechanisms concern the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemi-
cal Weapons and on their Destruction, called the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion. Their functioning is related to the activity of the Organisation for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is the executive authority for the 
convention. Beside permanent supervision of the chemical weapon stockpile in 
the countries which have declared its possession as well as of the destruction of 
TWA and their production facilities, the OPCW monitors the industrial activity 
of the states which are parties to the convention regarding chemical compounds 
which could be used to manufacture chemical weapons.
On the contrary, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on their Destruction, referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention, does 
not offer control mechanisms to check whether the biological weapon production 
ban is observed, analogously to what OPCW does. This means that the parties 
are not obliged to declare their biological agents or toxins used in legal activi-
ties. At the same time, the convention permits research on the defence against 
biological agents, which complicates the verification of the adherence to its pro-
visions. Many diseases are endemic, so research i.a. on the plague, anthrax or 
tularaemia may be justified and constitute a pretext for prohibited activities.
Regardless of the presented conditions, one should pay attention to selected 
operational features of biological weapons which are particularly important to 
terrorist organisations and states interested in their possession e.g. as an alterna-
ing of nuclear weapons. It includes over 460 partners from over a 100 countries. The organi-
sation originated from the activity of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War (IPPNW) — an international association which established ICAN in 2006 at a congress 
in Helsinki. IPPNW was established in 1980, allegedly at the grass roots level, in order to 
prevent the hazards related to a nuclear war outbreak and strive to abolish this weapon alto-
gether in the world. However, it is difficult to accept the association’s goals and the motives 
behind its establishment with the passing of time, especially after taking into account the 
fact that one of its founders was Evgeny Chazov, PhD, a scientist from the Soviet Union 
Cardiological University and a personal physician of the subsequent Soviet Union leaders: 
Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. See more in: J. Wojciechowski: Pokojowy Nobel 2017 
a broń jądrowa. “Biuletyn CSOPBMR” 2017, nr 4.
75 https://www.newsweek.pl/swiat/spoleczenstwo/pokojowa-nagroda-nobla-2017-ican/
2gzcych (accessed: 12.06.2019). 
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tive to nuclear weapons or elaborate conventional forces of a potential enemy. 
Biological weapon production entails a certain risk, but it is easier, cheaper and 
faster than the production of other WMD types for a number of reasons. Another 
important factor is the great diversity of micro-organisms, which are classified 
as: bacteria, viruses, fungi (excluding mushrooms), algae and protozoa.76 The 
Appendix to the Polish Act of 5 December 2008 on the prevention and control of 
infections and infectious diseases in people77 includes 59 medical conditions and 
biological pathogens, while the list of the most dangerous pathogens according 
to NATO standards contains 15 micro-organisms and toxins.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been mentioned many times in this 
article and still constitutes the basis for the proliferation combating system re-
garding this weapon category, is implemented via NPT Review Conferences 
organised every five years. Due to the inalienable right to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes (art. 4 of the NPT), the treaty entrusts the supervision of 
this activity to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Still, one must 
remember that the remaining agreements listed in the article, the CTBT and the 
TPNW, have not entered into force. Consequently, the supervision and control 
procedures provided for in the agreements remain in the planning phase.78
Beside disarmament agreements, other important manifestations of the inter-
national community’s activities to combat proliferation are so-called non-prolif-
eration initiatives and export control regimes. Generally speaking, international 
regimes include sets of “principles, norms, rules and procedures concerning de-
cision making which are characterised by convergent expectations of entities in 
a given field of international relations.”79 These are less formal because they are 
not based on legally binding agreements. The purpose and scope of their impact 
is clearly defined since it stems from the hazard perception by the states partici-
pating in these initiatives.
The largest group (100 countries) belongs to the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive (PSI), also called the Krakow Initiative because it was announced by Presi-
dent G. Bush at the Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow. It aims at preventing the 
smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and components used in its manu-
facture. The universality indicators of the remaining initiatives reach diversified 
values: 85% for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) 
76 Podstawy mikrobiologii lekarskiej. Podręcznik dla studentów. Red. L. Jabłoński. 
Warszawa 1979, p. 11.
77 Polish Act of 5 December 2008 on the prevention and control of infections and infec-
tious diseases in people (Dz.U. of 2008 no. 234 item 1570).
78 The CTBT anticipates establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organisation, while TPNW provision implementation will be supervised by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. However, this will require concluding additional detailed agree-
ments.
79 S. Krasner: Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables. In: International Regimes. Ed. S. Krasner. Ithaca 1983, p. 1—2.
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and 11% for the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPD) and the 
Vienna Group of Ten.80 The main objective of the export control regimes is 
to lay down export standards for dual-use products, i.e. those serving military 
and civilian purposes, which can be applied in WMD production. The regimes 
include drafting so-called control (threshold) lists which are regularly updated 
and constitute the basis for controlling the flow of prohibited materials and ex-
changing information between the member states. The most important regimes 
are: the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement.81 The 
average number of participants in the abovementioned forums is 34.
Conclusions 
The second decade of the 21st century is coming to an end. It will go down 
in history as an exceptionally stormy period with an intensification of various 
events, phenomena and processes which have had an unfavourable influence on 
the security of countries and regions as well as supraregional security.
At the beginning of the present decade, a total of 81 state, non-state and inter-
nal conflicts were waged worldwide. At the end of 2018, that number increased 
to 162,82 which was one of the highest values since 1975, when the register was 
started; the greatest increase (57%) concerned state conflicts. Some of them take 
place in the territories where weapons of mass destruction are present, can be 
80 The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was announced in 2006 by Presi-
dents G. Bush and V. Putin. It gathers 85 countries and aims at preventing nuclear terror-
ism via i.a. tracking the flow of nuclear materials. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Initiative aims at promoting the implementation of the arrangements made at the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference as well as intensifying the disarmament and non-proliferation effort. The 
Vienna Group of Ten promotes cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
81 The goals of the regimes are as follows: the Zangger Committee (the Nuclear Export-
ers Committee) aims at establishing a uniform interpretation of the provisions of art. III. 2. of 
the NPT; the Nuclear Suppliers Group promotes better understanding and support of nucle-
ar export control (especially concerning dual-use goods); the Missile Technology Control 
Regime wishes to ensure the non-proliferation of missile goods and technologies as WMD 
delivery means; the Wassenaar Arrangement strives to increase transparency and responsi-
bility in the transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use assets. Based on: Zobowiązania 




82 Statistical data and terminology based on: the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Con-
ducted at the Uppsala University — https://ucdp.uu.se/#/encyclopedia (accessed: 15.07.2019).
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transferred (manufactured) or remain within the range of the delivery means 
enabling their operational use. A combination of these facts justifies the thesis 
that the contemporary risk posed by this incredibly elaborate category of combat 
assets has increased. This is confirmed by the WMD and delivery means devel-
opment programmes in various states as well as multiple instances of chemical 
weapon use in recent years.
Ten years ago, the hazard related to WMD (CBRN incidents83) was per-
ceived first and foremost in the light of their use by non-state organisations, i.a. 
terrorist groups. The possible effects of releasing hazardous substances into the 
environment were also a source of concern. The possible military application 
was considered in extremely rare cases. Weapons of mass destruction, espe-
cially nuclear ones, were usually treated as Cold War relics. That conviction was 
strengthened by the faith in the effectiveness of bilateral (the United States — 
Russia) and multilateral agreements aimed at arsenal reduction and supervision 
as well as elimination of certain weapon types. Those hopes have proved futile. 
Proliferation (both horizontal and vertical) remains an indisputable fact which 
clearly proves the limited effectiveness of international agreements. One must 
also highlight that recent years have seen an increase in the significance of nu-
clear weapons in the tactical configuration as an asset allowing its owner to 
exert pressure in international relations or constituting a deterring element in 
the owner’s (or its allies’) military doctrine. A consequence of this is nuclear 
weapon modernisation in many countries classified as nuclear states (under the 
NPT). It commenced recently and is scheduled for implementation in the on-
coming years. Another disturbing phenomenon is the effort made to acquire this 
weapon by the states which are not parties to the NPT.
The topicality of the hazards related to the described problems and the great 
dynamics of the current events are proved by the fact that certain events, such as 
the meeting of Trump and Kim Jong Un in Panmunjom, a village located in the 
Korean Demilitarised Zone, or Iran’s announcement of resuming the uranium 
enrichment programme, took place when this article was already being writ-
ten. The topicality of the subject and its significance to the shape of the present 
and future international relations remain indisputable. All of this constitutes an 
inspiration to discuss these problems in a broader form which would permit 
a presentation and detailed description of the issues not included in this article 
for obvious reasons.
83 CBRN incident — every case related to the use of chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear weapons or CBRN devices, appearance of the action agents of such weapon or release 
of toxic industrial agents into the environment. See: M. Młynarczyk: Obrona przed bronią 
masowego rażenia w operacjach połączonych DD/3.8(A). Bydgoszcz 2013, p. 7.
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